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CONFLICT OF LAWS-THE DOING OF AN ACT AS THE BASIS
FOR JURISDICTION
No student of the subject of jurisdiction can fail to revert many
times to the statement of Justice Holmes that the foundation of
jurisdiction is physical power.n ' Although it is possible to mention
modern examples of the exercise of jurisdiction which at first glance
seem to belie such an analysis, nevertheless the very eminence of the
author is sufficient cause for hesitation in denying its accuracy except
after extended and detailed study. And it is possible that such a
study may show that the Justice, with customary insight, has reached
the fundamental concept.
If by physical power is meant only the actual present power to
"seize and imprison" the parties-which is said to have been the
original basis for jurisdiction-judicial thought and practice have
moved far beyond this stage.^ But if physical power is broken down
into its possible aspects, it becomes more difficult to suggest incon-
sistent illustrations.
Physical power may exist in at least four senses: (1) actual
physical power over the parties based upon presence; (2) a continua-
tioni of power which arose out of actual physical presence as in the
case of a defendant who was served within the state but subse-
quently left the state; (3) actual physical power over the subject
matter-the res-as in suits to quiet title to land; and (4) physical
power over the situs of the transaction out of which the cause of
action arose. The power of a state to render a judgment against a
foreign corporation that has done business within the state but has
since left it is an example.
It may well be queried whether all instances in which jurisdic-
tion is exercised can reasonably be said to be applications of one of
the above subdivisions of physical power.
An earlier note in this series of studies in the field of jurisdic-
tion considered the means by which jurisdiction over a corporation
may be secured. The writer questioned the accepted "doing business"
test in the case of foreign corporations and suggested one analogous
to the "doing of an act" theory, which is best illustrated by the non-
resident motorist statutes.
The purpose of the present note is to determine the nature of
the new concept by means of an examination of the cases in which
the doing of an act has been held sufficient to give jurisdiction. It
McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 91 (1916).
'Michigan Trust Co. v. Ferry, 228 U.S. 346 (1913).
'For example, Blackmer v. U.S., 284 U.S. 421 (1932).
'Note (1945) 33 Ky. L. J. 182.
8TUDEXT NOTES 317
may appear that the situations to which it has been applied are of a
fairly distinct type. If this is true, it then becomes a question of
determining whether as a matter of law it is possible to extend the
new theory, and whether as a matter of policy it is desirable to so
extend it.'
The doing of an act theory seems to be the subsequent ration-
alization of a group of three cases, rather than the conscious develop-
ment by the court (in the same three cases) of a new basis for juris-
diction. The advent of the automobile and the absence of Congres-
sional action under the interstate commerce power made inevitable
some sort of state regulation of highways when used by non-resident
motorists. The first of the three cases referred to above arose out of
one of the earliest of such regulatory statutes. A Maryland act re-
quiring out of state motorists to secure a license and pay a graduated
tax was upheld by the United States Supreme Court in 1915Y as a
reasonable exercise of the police power of the state in the interest of
safety. A year later the Court approved a New Jersey statute which,
going still further, required that an applicant for a license appoint
the Secretary of State his agent for the purpose of service of process
in any action arising out of the operation of a motor vehicle within
the state, with provision that notice of such service be mailed to
the post office address given in the application.- The power of the
state to regulate the use of its highways aid the necessity of such
regulation to promote safe driving were said by the Court to justify
such a statute.
The third in the series of cases and the one in which the new
theory took on its present form was Hess v. Pawloski. The plaintiff,
a citizen of Massachusetts, recovered a judgment in a Massachusetts
court against a citizen of Pennsylvania for injuries arising out of an
automobile accident occurring in the state of the forum. It was ad-
mitted that there had been no personal service on the defendant,
but recovery was based on a Massachusetts statute' providing for
service on a state official in such cases. The exact provisions of this
statute are important as it was to become a model for many similar
statutes. The act provided that:
".. acceptance ... by a non-resident motorist of rights and
privileges . . . as evidenced by his operating a motor vehicle ...
shall be deemed to be equivalent to an appointment .. .of the
registrar . . . to be his .. .attorney upon whom may be served
all lawful process in any action . . .growing out of an accident
- and said acceptance or operation shall be a signification
of his agreement that any such process . . . which is so served
. . . shall be of the same legal force . . . as if served on him
personally."
"'For a somewhat similar discussion see Note (1941) 29 Ky. L. J.
344.
Hendrick v. Maryland, 235 U.S. 610 (1915).
7 Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U.S. 160 (1916).
'274 U.S. 352 (1927).
'Ibid. at 354.
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In addition it was provided that a copy of the process must be
sent by registered mail to the defendant by the plaintiff, as evidenced
by a receipt signed by the defendant. And, as a final protection to
the defendant, the trial court was specifically directed to grant a con-
tinuance if necessary to assure him an opportunity to be heard.
In the Hess case the defendant challenged the statute as a viola-
tion of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice
Butler, in a brief opinion, affirmed the judgment of the Massachusetts
court without the apparent realization that the decision, if not revolu-
tionary, was at least novel and certain to open the way for the enact-
ment of the same type of statute in analogous situations. The Justice
took judicial notice that motor vehicles are "dangerous machines"
and reasoned, therefore, that in the public interest" . . . the State may
make and enforce regulations reasonably calculated to promote care
on the part of all, residents and non-residents alike, who use its
highways."' .. The question of service was dealt with by referring to
a series of cases holding various types of statutes valid or invalid,
concluding with a reference to the case upholding the New Jersey
statute with the observation that the difference between the formal
and informal agreement (that the state official should be consti-
tuted agent for receipt of service) was not substantial as far as the due
process clause is concerned. It is quite possible that some persons
would consider the difference to be substantial and would find the
mere statement to the contrary unconvincing.
In reading these three cases one cannot fail to note the lack of
discussion given to the problem of securing jurisdiction over an absent
defendant. That problem is dealt with as secondary, both in the New
Jersey case and in the Massachusetts case. The latter did refer to
Flexnor v. Farsonu as holding that the doing of business by an indi-
vidual within the state was not sufficient to authorize such service
but a reference to the New Jersey case, with the comment mentioned
above, was deemed adequate to meet the problem of service. It re-
mained for Wuchter v. Pizutti," a year later, to emphasize that a
statute of this type, to be constitutional, must provide for a method
of service reasonably calculated to inform the defendant of the suit
and give him an opportunity to defend. The statute in the Wuchter
case did not expressly provide for notice to the prospective defendant
and was held to be bad.
While the courts have been strict in the matter of how the notice
must be sent, some holding nothing less than registered mail and a
return receipt sufficient," it should be noted that the defendant is
not allowed to defeat jurisdiction by refusing to accept the notice
" Ibid. at 356.
248 U.S. 289 (1919).
"276 U.S. 13 (1928).
' Freedman v. Poirier, 134 Misc. 253, 236 N.Y.S. 96 (1929).
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or to sign the receipt.1 ' And, although the statutes are designed
primarily for the protection of residents as against non-residents, at
least two states' have held that a non-res.dent pla:ntiff may sue under
such a statute even though the defendant is a resident of the same
state as the plaintiff.
As far as the Supreme Court itself has attempted to justify
such statutes it has done so in terms of (1) public safety and (2)
consent. The enactment of such legislation by the state is said to be a
valid exercise of the police power and the defendant is considered to
have given his consent either actually or by operation of law. Stu-
dents of the subject of jurisdiction have expressed what may or may
not be the same thing technically by saying that the prospective
defendant, by coming into the state and doing an act, renders himself
liable to service in causes of action arising out of that act, provided
that service be in such a manner as is reasonably calculated to give
him notice and opportunity to defend. 3
Apparently the first extension from the non-resident motorist
statutes occurred in Iowa, where a statute was passed providing:" 7
"When a corporation, company, or individual has for the trans-
action of any business an office or agency in any county other
than that in which the principal resides, service may be made
upon any agent ... employed in such office .. . in all actions
growing out of or connected with the business of that office..
(Italics are ours.)
This act was held to be constitutional in Doherty v. Goodman,
a case in which the Iowa court had held a judgment against a non-
resident individual was valid, the only service on the defendant being
on his agent in the manner set out by the statute.
A similar statute had been before the court on a previous occasion
in Flexnor v. Farson." Justice Holmes, in his opinion, held that a
judgment based on this statute was not entitled to full faith and credit
in the courts of a sister state. The Justice distinguished the cor-
poration cases on the ground that the state, having power to exclude
a corporation altogether may impose reasonable conditions upon its
entrance into the state, but since a state cannot exclude an individual
citizen of another state it cannot, therefore, make consent to such
a method of service a condition of coming in and doing business.
Thus service under the statute was held insufficient for founding an
M persona, n action.
"Boss v. Irvine, 28 F. Supp. 983 (W.D. Wash., 1939).
'Hoagland v. Dolan, 259 Ky. 1, 81 S. W. (2d) 869 (1935); Rush
v. Circuit Court, 209 Wis. 246, 244 N. W. 766 (1932).
'" STUMBERG, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1937) p. 92; RESTATEMENT, CON-
FLICT OF LAWS (1934) Sec. 84; CHEATHAM, DOWLING, GOODRICH, CASES
ON CONFLICT OF LAWS (1936) p. 97.
Quoted in Doherty v. Goodman, 294 U. S. 623, 625 (1935).
'294 U.S. 623 (1935).
1 248 U. S. 289 (1919).
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The court in the Doherty case was faced with the choice of dis-
tinguishing the two cases or overruling the previous case. It chose
to do the former and pointed out that in the Flexnor case service was
on one not then an agent of the defendants. The writer believes that
this question of fact was not the controlling factor in the Flexnor
decision although Scott considers it a sufficient differentiation. ' The
opinion of Justice Holmes is written not in terms of fact but rather
in terms of law in regard to the matter of adequate service.
It is possible, however, to. reach the result in the Doherty case
without overruling the Flexnor decision, on the ground of an addi-
tional Iowa statute relating to the sale of securities, the particular
business in which the defendant was engaged. That statute, based on
the belief that the sale of securities requires special regulation, makes
it mandatory that persons desiring to sell securities must register
with the Secretary of State and consent to service on him in actions
growing out of such transactions. It is true that the proceeding in the
lower court,' which the United States Supreme Court affirmed, was
based on the general statute rather than on the special securities
statute. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court stresses the existence of the
special statute and makes it an important, if not the controlling factor
in the decision, there being an express statement that the effect of the
general statute under different circumstances was not considered.
It may well be doubted whether the court would have decided
the Doherty case as it did but for the existence of the special statute.
This doubt seems to have prompted the statement of Stumberga that
service upon an agent of an individual doing business within the state
is sufficient if such business, as an exceptional business, is subject to
regulation. It does not, however, necessarily follow that a similar de-
cision in the absence of such special regulation would be erroneous.
The non-resident motorist statutes are justified as an exercise of the
police power and the securities statute was a declaration that the sale
of securities, because of the opportunity for fraud, was a police power
situation.' As a matter of policy, the courts might well limit the ap-
plication of a general statute of the Iowa type to police power cases.
Let us suppose that there is no special statute concerning the
sale of patent medicine. A non-resident, X, sells a bottle of medicine
to Y whereby Y is injured and for which he seeks to recover judg-
ment against X, who has since left the state. Service is in accordance
with a statute of the general type. The court might well say that
since the sale of patent medicine directly affects the health of the
citizens, it is reasonable that the state provide some method by which
' Scott, Jurisdiction over Nonresident Motorists (1926) 39 HAnV.
L. REV. 563, 588.
'Doherty v. Goodman, 218 Iowa 529, 255 N. W. 667 (1934).
=STUMBERG, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1937) p. 95.
'Accord, Stevens v. Television, Inc., 111 N. J. Eq. 306, 162 Atl.
248 (1932).
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jurisdiction could be exercised over X in actions arising out of such
sale, subject always to the requirement that service be in such a
manner as to give X notice and opportunity to defend.'
It is clear that up to the present time the new concept has been
applied exclusively to situations which can be brought within the
police power of the state. It is interesting to note that a Texas federal
court,-' on the basis of a general statute, reached the same result
achieved under the non-resident motorist statutes, service being on
the non-resident defendant's agent within the state in an action aris-
ing out of an automobile accident within the state. And the Doherty
case has been cited" as a companion case to Hess v. Pawloski, with no
attempt to differentiate between them, in upholding non-resident
motorist legislation.
The question as to whether this new basis for jurisdiction should
be limited to police power cases must be met. It can be argued that
the interest of the state in the outcome, above and beyond that of the
individuals involved, justifies what might, in the absence of such in-
terest, be unwise. It becomes, then, a matter of policy, for there seems
to be no technical reason why it must be so limited. If, in a transac-
tion that is primarily individual in nature, the interest of the state is
the controlling element, even a limitation to police power cases would,
considering the present trend in governmental policy, result in the
exercise of jurisdiction in many instances beyond the traditional
police power concept.
Again let us suppose a case. A and B enter into a contract. A later
leaves the state and breaches the contract. Should B be able to
serve A under a general statute of the Iowa type? There seems to be
no technical difficulty, provided of course that service be in the re-
quired manner. It has been said in justification of the non-resident
motorist statutes that it works a harship on a resident of a state,
injured within the state, to have to follow the defendant to another
state."' It would seem that the hardship would be as great in a contract
as in a tort action. To the defendant's complaint that he is required to
return to defend a suit, it can be answered that he made the contract
under the protection of the law of the state and that if he were injured
he would use the processes of the court and the power of the state in
his behalf. As was said in answer to an objection to such service by
a foreign corporation,"N the defendant, having availed himself of the
" The writer believes this to be the proper rule in regard to cor-
porations despite Washington v. Superior Court, 289 U. S. 361. For a
criticism of that case see Note (1945) 33 Ky L. J. 182.
1 Dogget v. Peek, 32 F. Supp. 889 (N. D. Texas, 1940).
"Hoagland v. Dolan, 259 Ky. 1, 81 S. W. (2d) 869 (1935).
Morrow v. Asher, 55 F. (2d) 365 (N. D. Texas, 1932).
"- Wilson Packing Co. v. Hunter, 30 Fed. Cas. 253, No. 17852 (S. D.
Ill., 1879).
L. J.- 
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benefits of the laws of the state by doing business there, should not
be heard to complain of its burdens.
Reverting to the analysis of Justice Holmes, it is possible to ex-
press the same thought in terms of physical power when used in the
broad sense. The defendant was within the state when he did the
act out of which the cause of action arose. The state has within its
boundaries the situs of the transaction and it is reasonable that it
should exercise jurisdiction when the legal consequences of that act
are in question. The criminal law recognizes the jurisdiction of the
state in which the crime took place.- Tort law, at least to the extent
of motor accidents, considers the situs of the accident as sufficient to
give jurisdiction. The fact that the transaction is the making of a
contract rather than the commission of a crime or a tort seems im-
material.
In conclusion, it should be repeated that the doing of an act within
a state has been held sufficient for founding jurisdiction in the non-
resident motorist and securities cases only. The writer believes that
it is possible to extend its application to other situations as a matter
of law. It remains to be determined whether in the light of changing
conditions it would be wise, as a matter of policy, to make such
extensions.
ROSANNA A. BLAKE
"'RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934) Sec. 428 (2).
